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Buddhism and the State: The New
Relationship
Increasing numbers of believers bring great changes to the monastic
economy in China
Zhe Ji
NOTE DE L’ÉDITEUR
Translated from the French original by Philip Liddell
1 Buddhism, like other religions or traditional forms of worship, has boomed in China
over the past twenty years. This renaissance may be explained first of all by a softening
of the state’s policy towards religion since the reforms were launched at the end of the
1970s. China’s Buddhists now enjoy greater freedom to restore the monasteries, recruit
novices, organise ceremonies and spread their beliefs. The progressive discrediting of
the utopian grand narrative of communist society that once underlay the value system
defined by the state is also leading more and more individuals to turn—or turn back—
towards Buddhism. Buddhism helps them to find meaning in their experience of living
in a changing society. 
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In 2002 Shaolin Temple in Henan celebrated the 1500th anniversary of its founding
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2 But  to  see  the  new growth of  Buddhism in  China  as  merely  the  result  of  political
liberalisation  and  the  discrediting  of  official  ideology  would  be  to  reduce  the
relationship between the state and religion—in this case, Buddhism—to a sort of zero-
sum game, in which the strengthening of one force must lead to the weakening of the
other, and vice versa. This approach to the relationship between the state and religion
is simplistic and does not reflect the Chinese reality, neither in the past nor in the
present.  The  Chinese  state  and  Buddhism  have  an  extremely  complex  and  ever-
changing relationship1. While oppression and strict controls do still exist, negotiations
and  compromises  are  present  too.  Sometimes  the  state  even  contributes  to
rehabilitating and promoting Buddhism. In recent years, the Chinese government has
worked enthusiastically to build, rebuild or renovate Buddhist monuments. We may
cite  two  examples  among  so  many.  In  Sanya,  on  Hainan  Island,  where  Buddhism
formerly had little influence, the building of the Nanshan Temple, a great temple in the
Tang style,  was undertaken in 1995 with the support of the provincial government.
Occupying an area of 26.7 hectares, it was opened to the public in 1998. In the city of
Wuxi, in Jiangsu province, a huge 88-metre statue of the Buddha was erected in 1997,
and significant work is in progress on laying out the surrounding gardens dedicated to
Buddhist culture. The province sets great store by this project.
3 How should we understand this relationship between the state and Buddhism, made up
as it is of tensions and ambiguities? It is possible to understand it from various points of
view2. This article approaches this question from the angle of the monastic economy
and its development. Based on a historical review of the main characteristics of the
monastic economy and on my own field studies, it analyses the development of the
state’s relationship with Buddhism in the context of the diversification of economic
and social exchanges in China over the past twenty years.
“Combining Chan with agricultural work”: an economic strategy in conformity with
political ideology
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4 At the start of the 1980s, emerging from the nightmare that was, for Buddhism, the
Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), the Buddhist Association of China adopted as one of its
main  slogans  the  expression  “combining  Chan3 with  agricultural  work”  ( nong  chan
bingzhong/ju).  The  aim  was  to  encourage  the  monks  to  take  up  productive  labour
alongside  their  religious  activities,  in  particular  agricultural  work,  to  establish  a
monastic economy that might be self-sufficient. 
5 This approach was not entirely new. Indeed, the slogan has its origin in the work of
Taixu  (1889-1947),  the  most  famous  Chinese  Buddhist reformer  of  the  twentieth
century4.  At  the  end  of  the  1920s,  Taixu  was  inspired  by  the  monastic  regulation
introduced by the Chan master Baizhang Huaihai (749-814) of the Tang Dynasty, which
stressed the need to live on the fruit of one’s own labour in the fields5; accordingly,
Taixu suggested that Buddhists should take up this “agricultural Chan” (nong chan) and
to develop it into “work Chan” (gong Chan). Taixu hoped thus to encourage the monks,
particularly those less suited to Buddhist studies, to take up profitable work, whether
agricultural, commercial or industrial6. However, his conception was never really tried
out.
6 In 1950,  shortly after the Chinese People’s  Republic  was proclaimed,  one of  Taixu’s
disciples, Juzan (1908-1984), a monk who was close to the Communist Party, took up his
master’s  idea.  This  time,  the  combination  of  Chan and  “work”  became  one  of  the
principal means of adapting Buddhism to the communist revolution. Before 1949, the
monks lived mainly on the farm rents that they received, donations from the faithful
and income from religious services7. So the new government saw monks as exploiters
and as parasitic dependants on the feudal regime. In this situation, Juzan, supported by
a minority within the Buddhist elite eager to conform to the revolution’s demands,
proposed to “completely reform the present Buddhist system by productive labour”, in
order to “eliminate the status of landlords (dizhu) of the monasteries, the system of
private ownership of the hereditary monasteries and the superstitious services”8. That
is  how  the  expression  “combining  Chan9 with  agricultural  work”  arose,  and  was
subsequently proclaimed by the official  organisations of Buddhism. It  was with this
attitude of submission to “socialist  re-education” (shehuizhuyi  gaizao)  that Buddhism
underwent  agrarian  reform  (tudi  gaige)  in  the  early  1950s.  So  the  monks  were
expropriated  and  only  a  proportion  of  their  land,  according  to  criteria  set  at  the
regional level, was restored to the monasteries. Those in rural areas were considered by
the  state  as  production  units  and,  as  such,  they  were  subjected  to  successive
movements of agricultural collectivisation (nongye hezuohua), and then integrated into
the people’s communes (renmin gongshe). Chinese Buddhism did not escape its tragic
fate,  despite  its  efforts  to  adapt  during the first  phase  of  the  establishment  of  the
communist government. Its situation began to deteriorate at the end of the 1950s10; and
it  was almost  entirely wiped out during the Cultural  Revolution,  when most  of  the
monasteries were destroyed or confiscated by the state. The majority of the monks and
nuns were then forced to return to secular life.
7 In the early 1980s, as Buddhism was reviving, the expression “combining Chan with
agricultural  work” was taken up again,  this  time as  a  slogan.  It  was then officially
recognised as one of the “three excellent traditions of Chinese Buddhism”11.  On the
occasion  of  the  reunion  organised  for  the  thirtieth  anniversary  of  the  Buddhist
Association of China in 1983, Zhao Puchu (1907-2000), the Association’s President, re-
interpreted the  slogan in  these  terms:  “To adapt  Buddhism to  Chinese  society,  the
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Venerable Masters of Buddhism in our ancient history have, after several centuries of
research and experimentation,  established the rule  ‘combine Chan with agricultural
work’. Here we may understand the term “agricultural work” in the wider sense as the
whole range of work activities in the production of goods and services useful to society.
Chan means religious study and practice. [. . .] Since its foundation thirty years ago, the
Buddhist Association of China has made unceasing efforts to promote this excellent
tradition and, in the spirit of the maxim ‘A day without work is a day without food’ (yiri
buzuo, yiri  bushi)12,  it has always encouraged all Buddhists to take an active share in
productive labour or in any other activity that may serve the building of socialism.
Today,  as  we  find  ourselves  in  the  new  situation  of  socialist  modernisation,  we
Buddhists must further develop this excellent tradition of Chinese Buddhism.”13
8 This speech became, in the years that followed, the guiding principle of the monastic
organisation. The monasteries, those that were restored to Buddhist hands and newly
rebuilt,  organised the monks’  work so that  they took an active part  in agricultural
tasks,  by working on the land returned to them by the state.  Decollectivisation has
sometimes brought about the same situation that preceded the Cultural Revolution.
The  land  was  entrusted  to  the  monks  to  resume  their  work  on  it  or  to  the  local
authorities who rented it out to the monasteries (in the context of the system of the
chengbao).
9 Fujian is  the province where the greatest  number of  Buddhist  monasteries is  to be
found. It is particularly appropriate for us to observe there to what extent the principle
“combine Chan with agricultural work” was applied. An investigation into the economic
situation of 16 monasteries in the Ningde region14 indicates that, in 1983, 246 monks
and lay Buddhists lived in these monasteries and that their annual income totalled
163,935 yuan. Of that sum 14% came from the sale of food and from the income raised
by offering accommodation to visitors, and 10.3% from donations by the faithful and
from payment  for  religious  services;  the  harvest  from the  fields  and from forestry
provided 75.7% of their income. According to the “Report on the Third Meeting of the
Buddhist Monasteries of Fujian Devoted to the Exchange of Production Experience”,
published by the Buddhist Association of that province15,  in 1983, 1,176 monks were
living  in  the  50  monasteries  whose  delegates  had  attended  the  meeting.  The
monasteries had at that time 135.6 hectares of cultivated land producing 187,246 kilos
of rice. In addition, they reforested 162.8 hectares of mountainside and planted 30,500
fruit trees. Thanks to this work, in 1983 their income totalled 528,036 yuan and the
annual income per head rose to 450 yuan.  According to the “Report on the Fourth
Meeting Devoted to the Exchange of Production Experience”, published the following
year, the annual income per head in 80 monasteries had risen by 1984 to 1,004 yuan16,
which was a relatively large sum for that time.
10 Not all monasteries had fields. Some built factories or clinics; others traded in Buddhist
good-luck charms and charged an entry fee  for  visitors  to  the monasteries.  Others
again opened hotels or vegetarian restaurants, and so on. These “combinations of Chan
with industrial  work”  and “combinations  of  Chan with  commerce”  have  sometimes
been interpreted as new variations of “combinations of Chan with agricultural work”17.
11 To encourage the monasteries to go in for “productive labour”, some articles seeking to
show that “labour” is an essential condition of Chinese Buddhism were published in the
official journal of the Buddhist Association of China, Fayin. In 1985, 1986 and 1988, this
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journal  even  carried  a  regular  feature  entitled  “Models  of  Chan combined  with
agricultural work” (nong chan fengfan) reporting on exemplary monasteries. 
12 It  is easy to understand why Chinese Buddhism should have chosen at that time to
intensify  the  combination  of  Chan with  agricultural  work.  In  the  early  1980s,  the
relationship between the state  and Buddhism was extremely  unbalanced.  The state
refused  to  take  responsibility  for  having  destroyed  Buddhism,  and  the  financial
situation of the monasteries was very precarious. For many monks, agriculture was just
about the only means of survival. 
13 What is more, and this point is certainly the most significant, Buddhism and the other
religions had for a long time been stigmatised by the state. To some extent, Buddhism
was  still  considered  as  a  pernicious  leftover  from  the  old  society,  a  superstition
destined to disappear. Faced with this condemnation, Buddhism was obliged, as in the
1950s, to seek some way of legitimising its existence in a “socialist” society. Thus, on
the economic front, the monks had to take a direct share of physical work, to avoid
being accused of exploiting the masses, of being parasites. Putting it another way, the
purpose of introducing “the combination of Chan and agricultural work” was not only
to ensure the survival of the monastic community but also to harmonise monastic life
with the labour ethic imposed by the state. Monks had to be seen as “hardworking” and
Buddhism as  “useful”.  Consequently,  it  was  hardly  surprising  to  hear  in  nearly  all
broadcast reports devoted to the success of the “combination of Chan and agricultural
work” this repeated sentence: “The monks are contributing to building the socialist
state.”
“Cultivate the good earth” and “make merit”: towards a monastic economy founded on
cultural capital
14 In the 1990s, after an initial phase of rebirth and progress, the Buddhist monasteries
progressively  turned  away  from  “productive  labour”.  In  the  official  discourse,  the
slogan “combining Chan with agricultural work” appeared less favoured. Indeed, the
ethos  changed.  The  sacred  aura  surrounding  physical  work  melted  away  and
agriculture ceased to be the first  preoccupation of the Chinese state.  Consequently,
Buddhism had no further  strategic  need to  cling to  agricultural  work to  justify  its
existence. 
15 Little  by  little,  Buddhism  was  rehabilitated18.  The  number  of  Buddhists  swiftly
increased and the economic reforms allowed rapid growth in their purchasing power.
An  increasingly  significant  role  was  played  in  the  monastic  economy  by  financial
support  from  believers.  According  to  my  field  observations,  from  the  early  1990s
onwards,  gifts  from  lay  people  and  payments  in  exchange  for  religious  services
organised for lay people became the main source of income for most monasteries19.
16 It is difficult to find precise figures to evaluate the financial contribution from believers
to the monastic economy. Nevertheless, some examples are revealing. Temple B, where
I began a field study in 1994, is in the province of Hebei. It has no arable land, and has
no commercial activity other than the sale of books and Buddhist artefacts. Yet, this
temple underwent rapid development. Rebuilding work started in 1988. A lay Buddhist
in the locality had offered the monks a contribution of 100,000 yuan for the main hall
and, thanks to a Chinese Buddhist living in the United States, a new wing could also be
built at the temple entrance. From 1993 onwards, significant financial support began
flowing in from the Hong Kong business  community and from believers  across  the
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country.  Since  the  late  1990s,  the  temple’s  annual  budget  has  risen  to  around ten
million yuan. The whole of this sum comes from financial donations by believers.
17 Temple Z in Jiangxi was given back to the Buddhists in 1982. In the 1980s, all its monks
took part in agricultural work and the temple was cited several times in Fayin as a
model for having successfully combined Chan with productive work. Today it is the lay
farm labourers employed by the temple who take care of the paddy fields. The monks
take no part in field work except at peak periods of agricultural activity: they devote
themselves almost exclusively to Chan meditation. They say that the financial support
from believers is enough to support them and that agricultural work has become a
symbolic practice.
18 Why do Buddhists give significant sums of money to the monasteries? In fact, these
gifts are part of a transaction. If a temple is in a position to obtain support from lay
Buddhists, it is because it possesses cultural capital that, in some circumstances, can
supply the object of exchange20.
19 This exchange often takes place in a way that is symbolically institutionalised. In spite
of a two-thousand-year-long process of assimilation to China, Chinese Buddhism is still,
in  essence,  a  religion  of  other-worldly  orientation  with  a  dualist  classification  of
religious virtue.  Monks who devote themselves to recapturing the extreme state of
illumination  revealed  by  the  Buddha  are  the  models  and  the  masters  of  the  lay
believers. The latter can obtain only “a relative optimum of salvation by showing their
devotion to the holy examples”21. The monastery and its monks are a sacred cause. By
representing the Buddha and Dharma, the monks have the authority and the capacity,
made legitimate by tradition and by the Master’s charisma, to interpret doctrine, to
organise rites and to follow other-worldly practices. For this reason, it is in principle
compulsory for lay Buddhists to make offerings to the monks from which they also will
benefit,  as  in all  religions.  In Chinese,  this exchange is  called “cultivating the good
earth”  (zhong  futian)22 or  “making  merit”  ( zuo  gongde).  Lay  people  may  have  their
reward, either a purely moral one or carrying with it the hope of possible material
benefits.
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Renovation work at ount Wutai, Shanxi
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20 A whole range of practices are followed in the monasteries.  We shall  cite here two
examples.  The  “ceremony  of  water  and  earth”  (shuilu  fahui)  is  one  of  the  greatest
Buddhist rites and is performed for the salvation of the deceased. The presiding Master
gives  an address  extolling the merits  of  the  original  donor of  the service.  In  some
circumstances, a poem may be composed in his honour. A ceremony like this may cost
several hundred thousand yuan, most of it paid in the form of cash donations to the
monks  who  organise  it  and  take  part  in  it.  Because  of  the  shortage  of  religious
premises,  most  of  the donations from believers  are at  present used for  building or
rebuilding monasteries. In many of these one finds plaques on which are inscribed the
names of the donors and what they contributed. In this kind of exchange of material
wealth for symbolic wealth, the conversion rate is sometimes specified. In Temple B,
mentioned above, the building of an imposing new wing required about forty million
yuan. All those who gave money for the building were registered. The names of those
whose contributions amounted to several hundred yuan or more were engraved on a
plaque, while the names of those who gave more than 1,000 yuan were engraved on the
back of a statue of the Buddha.
21 The  increasing  contribution  that  lay  believers’  donations  make  to  the  monastic
economy has had a considerable influence on contemporary Buddhism. Buddhists flock
to  the  temples  in  order  to  satisfy  their  need  for  symbolic  solace.  It  helps  to  give
meaning to their experience of life, to lessen their suffering or to make their dreams
come true. Thus, if a monastery wishes to attract believers, it has to consolidate its
cultural authority and strengthen its capacity to manage its symbolic capital. In the
eyes  of  the  lay  community,  the  monastery  must  appear  profoundly  religious  and
sacred. Temporal business does nothing for sacredness; and today, if a temple devotes
itself too much to non-religious activity, it risks the disapproval of lay Buddhists and
the  loss  of  a  more  profitable  source  of  income  than  any  other.  The  monasteries
enjoying a good reputation for the purity of their “style in religious practice” (daofeng),
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those that had a significant place in history and are now recognised as ancestral courts
(zuting)23,  or  those  now  led  by  “superior  monks  and  great  virtuous”  (gaoseng  dade)
succeed more easily in attracting donations from lay believers. 
22 The monks are fully aware of the nature of their capital, and this is one reason why the
monasteries  take  great  care  to  display  their  historical  heritage.  These  days  it  is
essential for them to piece together their own histories, to celebrate the anniversaries
of their foundation or those of their great Masters of past years. Here we may cite two
examples. In 2002, the Hanshan Temple, in Jiangsu, celebrating its 1,500th anniversary,
published several volumes dedicated to its own history and to that of the great Masters
who had once lived there. In 2003, the monks of the Nanhua Temple in Guangdong, also
celebrating  the  anniversary  of  the  founding  of  their  temple,  organised  a  series  of
activities  including,  in  particular,  a  concert  of  Buddhist  music.  In  this  way,  these
monasteries and their monks lay claim to a religious prestige that they negotiate in a
sort of symbolic marketplace. 
23 A further significant example is the Shaolin Temple’s unremitting struggle to protect
its Shaolin brand, or shaolinsi. Being famed across the world for its martial arts tradition,
this temple had to confront a hundred or so fake versions of its brand in 11 countries.
In 1994, it decided to react. It brought a successful lawsuit against a food factory using
Shaolin as its own brand name. In subsequent years, it  emerged victorious in other
lawsuits in China and abroad. Today the Shaolin Temple owns the registered trademark
for  48  types  of  products  and  services  in  China.  Its  applications  to  register  the
trademark have been made in 68 foreign countries.  Shaolin is  not an isolated case.
Since 2003, the Hanshan Temple has registered its own trading name as well as those of
the great Masters from its history, and even one line dating from the Tang Dynasty
describing the Temple.
“Culture builds the stage and the economy performs”: a new relationship between the
state and Buddhism
24 A monastic economy based on exchanges between cultural capital and material capital
has  taken  the  place  of  a  self-sufficient  economy  based  on  agricultural  work,
craftsmanship and small traders. This evolution has remodelled the state’s relationship
with Buddhism. 
25 As  Buddhism’s  influence  among  lay  people  increases  and  exchanges  between
monasteries and believers become more frequent, the relationship between the state
and the monasteries has changed into a three-cornered affair. In addition to the monks,
the state must now face up to the lay believers whose interest in Buddhism is more and
more intense. The Chinese government, and in particular the local authorities who are
anxious to favour economic development, can no longer neglect the existence and the
needs of lay Buddhists who are at the same time investors and consumers. 
26 Attracting investors is now a key objective of the local authorities. At the present time,
Hong Kong and Taiwan are an important source of capital24, and numerous investors
are Buddhist. The latter are attentive not only to the communications network and to
natural and human resources but also to the religious environment. Moreover, their
decisions in the economic field are often influenced by Buddhist masters whom they
trust.  Thus,  the  government  sees  itself  forced  into  seeking  co-operation  with  the
monasteries. According to a report published by the Buddhist Association of China, the
Guangjiao Temple, in Jiangsu, has several times joined forces with the local authorities
to persuade business folk in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Japan to open up enterprises in
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Nantong25. Mr Yang, a Hong Kong retailer, has since 1993 given several million yuan to
Temple B in Hebei,  where I  carried out  part  of  my field study.  The local  authority
quickly understood that, Yang being Buddhist, his attachment to the regional temple
might  ensure  that  he  would  follow up his  investments.  So  a  top provincial  official
brought Temple B to his attention, a strategy that turned out effective.
27 It is common for religious ceremonies to attract many believers; this is an important
factor  in  the  development  of  tourism and of  the  whole  of  the  tertiary  sector  of  a
region’s industry. The production of, and trade in, religious artefacts (statues of the
Buddha, strings of beads, good-luck charms, incense, candles, printed icons, and so on)
are  a  considerable  source  of  income  for  the  local  people.  Accordingly,  the  local
authorities  often  look  positively  on  the  building  of  monasteries  and  Buddhist
monuments. Each year, Temple B opens its doors to a large number of visitors, as many
as ten thousand a day at the time of the biggest ceremonies.  In a district with few
attractions, such crowds are extraordinary. The local authority was encouraged to lend
support  to  almost  all  the  projects  undertaken  by  the  temple  and  especially  to  its
purchase of land for large-scale construction projects. On its own initiative, in 2002, a
market for religious objects was installed in front of the temple, in a space measuring
24,000 square metres. 
28 In  Shanghai,  in  parallel  with  the  municipal  government’s  work  on  rebuilding  and
enlarging the Jing’an Temple, it has laid out a commercial district alongside the Temple
in a pedestrianised street. In Changsha, in Hunan, the Communist Party committee and
the local council are at present directing the renovation of the Kaifu Temple, which is
to occupy an area of five to twelve hectares after work aimed at “improving the quality
of the different services of the city and its environment, raising its cultural level and
promoting  the  development  of  local  trade  and  religious  tourism”.  In  the  city  of
Nanking, in Jiangsu, the departments responsible for construction and gardens in the
Xuanwu  district  have  spent  five  million  yuan  on  building  a  museum  dedicated  to
Xuanzang (602?-664),  a  Chinese  monk of  the  Tang Dynasty  who went  to  India  and
brought back numerous Sutras. In the same city, two local administrations had plans to
rebuild  the  Pagoda  of  the  Dabaoen  Temple  that  was  destroyed  in  1865  during  the
Taiping Rebellion. The city government finally decided to rebuild it on its former site26.
29 Not only does the state work towards rebuilding Buddhist sites, but it also seeks to
exploit the tourist potential of existing monasteries. In Jiangsu, the Tourism Bureau
organises  celebrations  around  great  temples  such  as  the  Hanshan  Temple  and  the
Daming  Temple  on  January  1st  and  over  the  Chinese  New  Year.  On  nearly  all  the
Buddhist Mountain Sanctuaries, such as Mount Emei in Sichuan and Mount Heng in
Hunan, Buddhism is at the heart of strategies for developing tourism. In Shaanxi, every
year since 2001, the authorities in the city of Baoji  have been organising a tourism
festival at the Famen Temple. In 2003, the Zhejiang government did not hesitate to
invent a festival called the Festival of the Bodhisattva of the South Sea on Mount Putuo,
in order “to stimulate the development of the tourist economy”27. In 2004, the Xinzhou
city  government  in  Shanxi  decided  to  sponsor  a  "Festival  of  Buddhist  Culture"  on
Mount Wutai, with the participation of monasteries in the region. 
30 In  general,  the  monasteries  choose  to  co-ordinate  their  activities  with  the  tasks
assigned by the local authorities. Although they are often under obligation to do so and
although the various local government departments take the lion’s share of the profit,
the monasteries do benefit from the organisation of these activities. The monks are
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enabled in effect to put Buddhism in contact with the public, in a society where religion
is  often  officially  excluded  from  public  life,  to  build  monasteries  and  to  organise
religious  activities  quite  lawfully.  “The  development  of  tourism”  just  like  “the
development of  a  favourable environment for investment” helps Buddhism and the
state to reach a compromise: wearing politically correct clothing, each side can reap
the benefits it seeks.
31 Mount Heng, where there are many Buddhist monasteries, is an excellent illustration of
these links between the state and the monasteries. The local government has granted
to an eminent monk in the region the honorary title of “Head Tourism Guide” and,
conversely, a monastery organises on its own initiative, occasionally, days of activities
aimed  at  promoting  Buddhism  among  lay  people  in  the  context  of  “cultural  and
religious tourism”. In June 2003, the leading monk in the Jiming Temple in Nanking
signed a contract with the local authority for “the tourist exploitation of the Mount
Donglu region”; the main project is the building of a temple. Today, the state and the
monasteries  are  committed  to  a  relationship  of  co-operation  that  is  working  out
profitably for both sides.
32 Admittedly, co-operation is only one aspect of the relations between the state and the
monasteries. The state appropriates a large part of Buddhism’s resources: this is done
mainly through departments responsible for tourism. The government continues to
seize many monasteries, especially those that have a significant religious and cultural
heritage.  Some  monasteries  already  restored  to  the  Buddhists  are  forced  into
submitting  to  “co-management”  with  the  local  tourism  bureau.  The  government’s
intention in some cases is to manage the material or symbolic property of Buddhism
exactly as it pleases. While recent changes should not mask the continuance of such
behaviour, it is possible to assert that the one-sided relationship that formerly existed
between  the  state  and  the  monasteries  has  developed  into  a  more  complex
relationship.
33 The changes that have taken place within this relationship over the past two decades
may be perceived as a process of revision to a game in which each player chooses a
strategy according to  his  capital,  his  objectives  and his  estimate of  the capital  and
objectives of the other players. The rules of the game depend on the number of players,
and on the form and value of their capital; on how deep are the changes made and in
which direction. In the days of the slogan “combining Chan with agricultural work”, the
state possessed all the resources and was thus in a position of absolute mastery. The
monasteries were then forced to observe the rules as defined by the state, the Buddhist
term “excellent tradition” being no more than a translation of these rules.
34 A decade after the policy of reform and openness was introduced, the believers began
to take a hand in the game. Since they had the economic capital, they contributed to
promoting  the  cultural  capital  of  Buddhism,  thus  having  a  profound  effect  on  the
interaction  between  monasteries  and  state.  The  latter  used  its  political  power  as
capital,  authorising it  to decide which practices and discourse were possible.  As for
Buddhism, its capital was founded on the symbolic power of religion, which enabled it
to  mobilise  believers  or  amateurs  of  Buddhist  culture.  The  state’s  political  capital
cannot  be  directly  exchanged  for  the  economic  capital  of  the  Buddhist  believers
because it must first be converted into religious cultural capital. So the state, and in
particular local government, is obliged to seek an alternative method of transaction
with  the  monasteries.  While  the  state  can  seize  some Buddhist  resources  using  its
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political power, it is nevertheless indispensable for it to co-operate with the monks,
because  the  exploitation  of  the  Buddhist  cultural  capital  demands  that  Buddhist
authority should grant it symbolic recognition.
35 The important  thing for  the  government  has  always  been,  not  the  development  of
Buddhism itself, but the economic benefit that can be extracted from it. This may be
illustrated by a slogan often quoted in the official discourse: “Culture builds the stage
and  the  economy  performs”  (wenhua  datai,  jingji  changxi).  But  the  measures  the
government has taken in favour of economic development over these past ten years
have  nevertheless  granted  for Buddhism  a  space  in  which  it  can  develop  quite
legitimately. So Buddhism and the state are today involved in a complex relationship: a
game in which each,  in  its  own interests,  must  take account of  the other,  and the
interests of one sometimes require it first to work for the interests of the other.
NOTES
1. In 1953, the Buddhist Association of China was founded, a national organisation to
head all the monasteries on Chinese soil. Up to now, it has been through its supervision
of the Association that the Chinese state has regulated the practice of Buddhism. For
example, the Association’s nomination of the head of a monastery has to be submitted
for the approval of the Religious Affairs Bureau. Yet while the Chinese government’s
policy towards religious institutions is constantly evolving, the policy is applied with
much variation according to the interests of local authorities and the precise form of
their relationships with the monasteries. See the case study by Wu Fei, “Yige simiao de
zhidu bianqian” (The Institutional Change of a Temple), Beijing daxue yanjiusheng xuekan
(Peking University Graduate Student Journal), No. 1, 1998, pp. 28-38. In this study Wu
Fei shows clearly the complex and changing relations between a Buddhist temple, the
local authority and local society.
2. For example, because of the influence of Buddhism with some non-Han Chinese and
in some Asian countries, Buddhist interventions among ethnic minorities or in
diplomatic relations confer a form of legitimacy on Buddhism and thus raise significant
issues.
3. Chan is a Chinese Buddhist order that was created in the seventh and eighth
centuries. Because of its primary influence on Chinese Buddhism, the word Chan is
sometimes used to designate Buddhism as a whole. See, for example, Paul Demiéville, 
Choix d’études bouddhiques, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1973, and Bernard Faure, Chan Insights and
Oversights: An Epistemological Critique of the Chan Tradition, Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 1993.
4. Cf. Hong Jinlian, Taixu dashi de fojiao xiandaihua zhi yanjiu (Great Master Taixu’s
Modernization of Buddhism), Taipei, Dongchu chubanshe, 1995; Don Alvin Pittman, 
Toward a Modern Chinese Buddhism. Taixu’s Reforms, Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press,
2001.
5. On the historical impact of Baizhang Huaihai’s ideas on China’s monastic economy,
cf. Shengkai, “Lun Zhongguo fojiao dui shengchan taidu de zhuanbian” (The changing
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attitudes of Chinese Buddhism towards productive work, World Hongming Philosophical
Quarterly, March 2003, http://www.whpq.org/whpq/200003/200003/007.htm. For an
in-depth study in French on the monastic economy in imperial times, see Jacques
Gernet, Les Aspects économiques du bouddhisme dans la société chinoise du Ve au Xe siècle,
Ecole française d’Extrême-Orient (EFEO), vol. 39, Paris, 1956.
6. Cf. Taixu, “Seng zhi jin lun” (Essay on a monastic institution), in Taixu dashi quanshu
(Complete Works of the Great Master Taixu), Taipei, Shandaosi, 1980, 3rd edition, vol.
17, pp. 195-199; “Rengong yu fo hua zhi xin seng hua” (The new community of monks
combining work with religious studies), ibid, vol. 18, pp. 163-166. At the time, the
proposal for professional differentiation in religious communities had the primary aim
of distinguishing monks with a real religious vocation from those for whom Buddhism
was simply a way of life. It was hoped also to protect Buddhist property from threats by
anti-religious political forces. Cf. Hong Jinlian, op. cit., pp. 62-63, p.73, and IV-1.
7. Cf. Holmes Welch, The Practice of Chinese Buddhism: 1900-1950, Cambridge, Harvard
University Press, 1967, Chapter VIII.
8. Juzan, “Yinian lai gongzuo de zibai” (Record of work carried out during the past
year), Xiandai foxue (Modern Buddhist Studies), vol. 1, No. 2, 1950, p. 22.
9. Cf. the early editions of Xiandai foxue at the start of the 1950s. This journal, then
edited by Juzan, became the official journal of the Buddhist Association of China
founded in 1953. It ceased publication in 1964.
10. The situation becomes particularly critical in 1957, at the start of the anti-rightist
movement (fanyou). For a study of the general situation in which Chinese Buddhism
found itself during the 1950s and 1960s, cf. Holmes Welch, Buddhism under Mao,
Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1972. 
11. The other two “excellent traditions” are “intellectual study” (xueshu yuanjiu) and
“international friendly exchange” (guoji youhao jiaoliu). Cf. Zhao Puchu, “Zhongguo
fojiao xiehui sanshi nian” (Thirty years of the Buddhist Association of China), Fayin
(Voice of Dharma), No. 6, 1983, pp. 13-21; “Fayang fojiao youliang chuantong, wei zuguo
shehuizhuyi shiye er xianshen” (Developing excellent traditions to devote oneself to
the socialist undertaking of one’s country), Fayin, No. 1, 1982, pp. 2-4. Since 1981, Fayin
has been the official journal of the Buddhist Association of China.
12. This maxim comes from an anecdote on the Chan master Baizhang Huaihai.
Baizhang was forever working with his disciples. One day, a monk hid his work tools so
that he might rest. Baizhang said, “I have no virtue: how can I depend on other people’s
work?” He looked everywhere for his tools, so much so that he forgot to eat. Cf. Puji
(South Song), “Baizhang Huaihai chanshi” (Master Chan Baizhang Huaihai), Wu deng hui
yuan, Peking, Zhonghua shuju, 1984, III, p. 136. This maxim is often quoted today to
show that agricultural work is part of the tradition of Chinese Buddhism.
13. Zhao Puchu, ibid.
14. Renren, “Nong chan bingzhong, zili lita. Fujian Ningde diqu shiliu zhuo simiao
xingban shengchan fuwu shiye de qingkuang diaocha” (Combining Chan with
agricultural work, doing good for oneself and for others. Investigation on the economic
situation of 16 monasteries in the Ningde region of Fujian), Fayin No. 3, 1985, pp. 24-26.
15. Un-attributed article: “Fayang nong chan bingzhong de chuantong. Foxie Fujian
fenhui zhaokai di san ci simiao shengchan jingyan jiaoliuhui” (Developing the excellent
tradition of combining Chan with agricultural work. Report on the third meeting of the
Buddhist monasteries of Fujian devoted to exchanging experiences in the matter of
production), Fayin, No. 3, 1984, pp. 9-10.
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16. Minfo, “Fujian sheng fojiao simiao di si ci shengchan jingyan jiaoliu dahui zai rong
zhaokai” (Report on the fourth meeting of the Buddhist monasteries of Fujian devoted
to exchanging experiences in the matter of production), Fayin, No. 3, 1985, p. 26.
17. Cf. Chen Bing, “Fojiao yu shehuizhuyi xiang xietiao wenti” (On adapting Buddhism
to Socialism), Fayin, No. 12, 1991, pp. 14-18.
18. By the mid 1990s, regions inhabited by ethnic Han already included 40,000 monks
and nuns, 5,000 monasteries and about twenty Buddhist schools, cf. Jinghui, “Jinri
Zhongguo fojiao gaikuang” (General situation of Chinese Buddhism today), Huadu fayu
(The Rain of Dharma in Paris), Peking, Sanlian shudian, 1994, pp. 3-4.
19. Raoul Birnbaum has made the same point, cf. his “Buddhist China at the Century’s
Turn”, The China Quarterly, No. 174, June 2003, pp. 442-443. It is often difficult to make a
distinction between donations from lay people and the income from religious services,
except in some specific cases, such as, for example, funeral rites. Even though this
expectation is not always expressed, the donation often demands a service or a promise
in exchange. Conversely, lay people may also pay for religious services in the form of
deferred gifts. In my view, these two types of transactions can be summed up as an
exchange between material capital and cultural capital.
20. On the concept of cultural capital and its symbolisation, cf. Pierre Bourdieu, “The
Forms of Capital”, in J Richardson (ed), Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology
of Education, New York, Greenwood Press, 1988, pp. 241-258; Raisons pratiques, Paris,
Seuil, 1994, p. 161.
21. Max Weber, Sociologie des religions, Paris, Gallimard, 1996, p. 169 ; see also ibid, p. 334.
22. Cf. Wu Yongmeng, “Fojia de futian guan jiqi fuli sixiang” (The notion of futian and
the idea of well-being in Buddhism), Wenyi fuxing, No. 60, 1975, Taipei, pp. 43-50.
23. A Buddhist monastery where in ancient history there once lived a great Master,
often the place of origin of a lineage.
24. Since the start of the economic reforms, each year, investment from Hong Kong has
added up to over 30% of total foreign investment, direct or indirect, in mainland China
and has been greater than the investment from any other single country or region.
Taiwan is also among the most important investors in mainland China. See the
statistical yearbooks for these past years (Zhongguo tongji nianjian) compiled by the
National Statistical Bureau, and published by Zhongguo tongji chubanshe.
25. Yuelang, “Shilun simiao zai gaige kaifang xinxinshi xia de diwei he zuoyong” (The
position and the function of the monasteries in the context of the reforms and
openness), Dangdai fojiao (Contemporary Buddhism), edited by Jinghui and Kuanren,
Peking, Buddhist Association of China, 1996, pp. 202-205.
26. Jinling Wanbao (Nanking Evening News), August 9th 2002.
27. http://guanyin.zjol.com.cn. In reality, two festivals are superimposed. First of all
there is the traditional, religious, festival of Nanhai Guanyin, which is held in a Buddhist
holy place. And in parallel is held the modern festival, organised by the state in
response to the aims of local economic development.
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RÉSUMÉS
In the early 1980s, Buddhism in China entered a period of revival and prosperity, yet it retained a
sense of public disgrace inherited from nearly three decades of persecution. In order to survive
and to conform to the ethical system imposed by the government, the monks were forced to
engage in “productive labour”. However, Buddhism’s growing influence among lay people, and
the  increasing  number  of  exchanges  between  monasteries  and  believers  promoted  a  steady
growth in the value of Buddhism’s cultural and religious capital. From the 1990s onwards, local
authorities sought to co-operate with Buddhism, hoping to profit by its cultural capital through
attracting investors and promoting tourism. The state did not cease to control and to oppress the
Buddhists although, guided by economic interests, it contributed in some cases to promoting and
reconstructing  Buddhism:  the  monasteries  thus  found  new  legitimacy  and  new  space  for
development. 
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